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Abstract
This paper presents a new efficient protocol for k-out-of-n obliv-
ious transfer which is a generalization of Parakh’s 1-out-of-2 oblivi-
ous transfer protocol based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In the
proposed protocol, the parties involved generate Diffie-Hellman keys
obliviously and then use them for oblivious transfer of secrets.
1 Introduction
Oblivious Transfer [13, 12, 11] of secrets between two parties is a very useful
primitive for the construction of larger cryptographic schemes. It is a method
by which a commodity from a set is transferred from a sender to a receiver
based on the receiver’s choice. However, the sender should be oblivious to the
choice that the receiver made, i.e. he should be unaware of which commodity
the receiver is in possession of at the end of the transaction. Oblivious Trans-
fer has applications in the areas of secure multiparty computation, private
information retrieval (PIR), fair electronic contract signing, oblivious secure
computation, etc. [8, 1, 2, 7].
In this paper, we present a k-out-of-n generalization of the 1-out-of-2
oblivious transfer protocol proposed by Parakh [12]. He presented a pro-
tocol that established an oblivious key exchange between two parties using
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the Diffie-Hellman protocol at its core. Once the keys were exchanged the
parties would use a symmetric key cryptosystem for the transfer of secret
messages, thus making the transfer more efficient compared to using a public
key cryptosystem. The scheme may further be used to establish oblivious
transfer channel for the transfer of large secrets.
A k-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer is when the receiver can choose to receive
k secrets from a set of n secrets that the sender is in possession of. For exam-
ple, Bob may have a set of n files protected by individual passwords that are
immune to trial-and-error (due to their length or complexity or both). Alice
is in possession of the passwords for these files. Now, Bob wants to open k
of these files for which he would need their respective passwords from Alice.
Also, he doesn’t want Alice to know which of the n files he wishes to read.
Oblivious Transfer can come to the rescue in such a situation. It will enable
Bob to learn the passwords of the k files that he wants to read and at the
same time, prevent Alice from knowing which passwords Bob has actually
acquired. One must also bear in mind that given the k passwords, it should
not be possible for Bob to compute any of the remaining (n− k) passwords.
Thus, the goals of Oblivious Transfer can be summarized as follows:
• Receiver’s Privacy: Alice should not be able to determine which k
secrets Bob has acquired.
• Sender’s Privacy: Bob should not be able to learn any of the remain-
ing (n− k) secrets using the k secrets that he has received.
2 Previous Work
Rabin’s Oblivious Transfer protocol allowed the receiver to receive a bit with
a probability 1
2
. The sender on the other hand, could not determine whether
the receiver has received the bit or not. This idea was later used to establish
1-out-of-2 OT protocols that can be extended easily to 1-out-of-n protocols
[3] and these in turn can be converted into k-out-of-n protocols by merely
running the protocol k times [16]. However, as expected, the computational
cost of these extended protocols would be high. It is possible to reduce the
complexity by developing 1-out-of-n and k-out-of-n protocols directly from
primitives (without the successive runs of lower order protocols) [3, 14, 15].
2
k-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer3 PARAKH’S OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER PROTOCOL
Both the possibilities of successive protocol runs and direct implementation
have been explored in Oblivious Transfer protocols [4].
In [5], Chu and Tzeng devised a scheme for implementation of 1-out-of-n
and k-out-of-n protocols based on the Discrete Log problem. They compared
the cost of their protocol to that of Mu, Zhang, and Varadharajan [9] and
Naor and Pinkas [10]. Although their 1-out-of-n protocol was of O(n), their
k-out-of-n protocol used k successive runs of their 1-out-of-n protocol. This
increases the cost of their k-out-of-n scheme to O(kn). Wu, Zhang, and
Wang [17] improved this efficiency in their paper and developed a protocol
that was of O(k + t) using a two lock cryptosystem. This protocol does not
involve the use of Diffie-Hellman based keys. An efficient oblivious transfer
protocol using Elliptic Curve Cryptography was presented in [11].
3 Parakh’s Oblivious Transfer Protocol
Oblivious transfer using Diffie-Hellman keys was presented in [12] . Here,
Alice encrypts the two secrets she is willing to disclose, under two different
encryption keys and associates these keys with two distinct choices. She then
establishes a 1-out-of-2 oblivious key exchange such that Bob is able to only
compute one of the keys based on his choice. Consequently, upon receiving
the encrypted secrets, Bob is only able to decrypt one of them.
We provide a brief description of the protocol here in order to make the
idea of oblivious key exchange clear. However, our description differs slightly
from that presented in [12] because we note that the pre-requisite of choosing
two numbers x1 and x2 such that c = x
2
1 = x
2
2 (mod p) is not necessary for
successful execution of the protocol.
Assuming a safe prime p, a generator g, and x1 and x2 be two randomly
and uniformly chosen numbers from the field Zp, denote the two secrets that
Alice possesses by S1 and S2. She then associates x1 with S1 and x2 with S2
(without disclosing the secrets). She announces these associations to Bob;
denote Bob’s choice by xB. Bob’s task is to establish either key K1 or K2
with Alice, according to which secret he is interested in obtaining.
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Alice secretly chooses NA1 and sends to Bob: g
x1+NA1 (mod p);
2. Bob chooses xB = x1 (if he wants secret S1) or xB = x2 (if he wants
secret S2) and secret numbers NB and NB1 ;
3
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3. Bob sends to alice:
(
g
x1+NA1
gxB
)NBNB1 (mod p) and gNB (mod p);
4. Alice chooses a number NA2 and sends to Bob:
[(
g
x1+NA1
gxB
)NBNB1 ]NA2
(mod p);
5. Bob computes: KB ≡
[(
g
x1+NA1
gxB
)NBNB1NA2 ] 1NB1 (mod p)≡
(
g
x1+NA1
gxB
)NBNA2
(mod p);
6. Alice computes: K1 ≡ g
NBNA1NA2 (mod p) andK2 ≡ (g
NB(x1−x2+NA1 ))NA2
(mod p); and
7. Alice encrypts secret S1 using K1 and secret S2 using K2 and sends
them to Bob.
From the above sequence we see that if Bob chooses xB = x1, then KB =
K1, and if Bob chooses xB = x2, then KB = K2. Hence, Bob will only be
able to retrieve one of the two secrets depending upon his choice, while Alice
will not be able to determine which secret Bob has retrieved. Hence, Bob
has obliviously established a secret key, or his choice, with Alice.
4 Assumptions in this Paper
Throughout the paper we assume that Alice is the party having possession
of n secrets or in other words, is the sender. Bob is the party that wants to
learn one or more secrets obliviously. Alice and Bob are both assumed to
be honest but curious parties, i.e. in spite of their honesty, they will try to
obtain more information than they are entitled to.
The protocol has no way assuring the legitimacy of the secrets handed
over by Alice to Bob during the transaction. However, for the purpose of this
protocol we do assume that any message exchange between two parties over
a channel is duly signed by the sender. In case of a fraud (in the contents
of the messages) the victim can later use these digital signatures as evidence
against the adversary during adjudication.
5 1-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer
For the security of the protocol, we have exploited the fact that finding
the exponent e in the equation xe (mod p) = y where x and y are given)
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is equivalent to solving a discrete log problem (DLP). Let g ∈ Zp be the
generator of the Diffe-Hellman group Zp where p is considered to be a safe
prime.
Let there be a set of numbers x1, x2, ..., xn known both to Alice and Bob.
Say Alice has n secrets S1, S2, ..., Sn and Bob wants to acquire the i
th secret
Si, then Bob will choose xi for the generation of key as per the protocol.
Let KAi be the key used by Alice to encrypt the secret Si for all i, and
KB be the key generated by the Bob for decryption of the secret. NA1 and
NA2 are ephemeral nonces generated by Alice and NB1 , NB2 and NB3 are the
ephemeral nonces generated by Bob in the protocol run.
5.1 Mutual Agreement
Alice and Bob both agree upon a safe prime p, a generator element g of group
Zp and the set {x1, x2, ..., xm−1, xm}. Each member xi of the set corresponds
to the ith secret. All the nonces generated by the parties are ephemeral.
5.2 The Protocol
1. Alice generates random nonceNA1 and sends the messageMA = g
NA1+Σ
n
i=1
xi
(mod p) to Bob.
2. Bob selects xj as per the secret he wants to acquire, and generates
three nonces NB1 , NB2 and NB3 such that NB3 = k x NB2 where k is a
factor of NB1 .
3. Bob sends the message
M1 = (
MA
g
xj (mod p)
)
NB1
NB2
NB3 (mod p) to Alice.
4. Bob also sends MB = g
NB1 (mod p).
5. Alice generates nonceNA2 and the set of keys {KA1, KA2, ..., KAn−1 , KAn}
as
KAk = ((MB)
NA1+Σ
n
i=1
xi−xk)NA2 (mod p)∀k ∈ [1, n].
6. Alice sends the message [M1]
NA2 (mod p) to Bob.
5
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7. Bob calculates KB as [[M1]
NA2 ]
NB3
NB2 (mod p).
8. Alice sends all the secrets encrypted under the respective key (Si is en-
crypted under the key generatedKAi), i.e. {S1}KA1 , {S2}KA2 , {S3}KA3 ,...
{Sn}KAn .
9. Bob can then decrypt the locked secret that he wished to learn using
the key KB he has generated.
Figure 1: 1-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer Protocol Run
5.3 Security Proof and Cost Analysis
It is easy to see that if Alice wishes to know Bob’s choices she would have to
know xi that is conveyed in the form g
xi (mod p). In order to do this, she
would have to solve the Discrete Log Problem. However, solving the Discrete
Log Problem is considered computationally intractable. Thus, receiver’s pri-
vacy is assured.
If Bob wishes to acquire more than the k secrets he is entitled to, he
will have to obtain the nonce NA2 which is again equivalent to solving the
Discrete Log Problem, thus ascertaining sender’s privacy.
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The computational costs due to exponentiation at Alice’s and Bob’s ends
are n + 1 and 2 i.e. O(n) and O(1) respectively. The transfer cost is quite
plainly n + 4 i.e. O(n). This is equal in order to the protocol proposed in
[5] which is also based directly on cryptographic primitives.
5.4 Same Message Attack
However, the protocol is vulnerable against the same message attack. i.e. if
all the secrets that Alice sends are the same, then (trivially) no matter which
secret Bob chooses, Alice will always know the secret he has chosen. This
attack can be avoided with a simple addition of the following steps to the
protocol.
1. Alice also sends the hash value of each secret to Bob that is Hash(S1),
Hash(S2), ... Hash(Sn).
2. Bob verifies if all the hash values received are distinct. If Alice has sent
distinct secrets and hashed them honestly, then the hashes will prove
to be different.
3. Bob then decrypts {SAi}Ki using KBi calculated by him.
4. Check if
Hash(decrypt({Sj}KAj ,KB)) ==RecievedHash(Sj). In case the match
fails, it means that Alice has either sent him fake hashes in order to
make them different, or she has hashed them dishonestly.
Alice will have an extremely low probability of getting away with a Same
Message Attack. It will happen only in the case that Alice hashes only one
secret honestly, fakes the other hashes and Bob picks the secret that is hashed
correctly. We assume that the probability of this happening will be very low.
6 k-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer
k-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer scheme is when Alice is in possession of n
secrets and Bob wishes to learn k of them. This can, of course, be achieved
by running our 1-out-of-n protocol k times, once for each secret. But, it
would save computation and transfer cost if we establish a different protocol
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for the same that is inspired from our 1-out-of-n protocol. The proposed k-
out-of-n protocol is again reliant on the Discrete Log Problem for its security
and uses Diffie-Hellman [6] based keys for locking and unlocking secrets.
6.1 Mutual Agreement
Alice and Bob both agree upon a safe prime p, a generator element g of group
Zp and the set x1, x2, ...xn. Each member xi of the set corresponds to the ith
secret. They also agree upon the number of secrets to be transferred k.
6.2 The Protocol
1. Alice generates random nonceNA1 and sends the messageMA = g
NA1+Σ
n
i=1
xi
(mod p) to Bob.
2. Bob selects {x1, x2, ...xk} as per the secrets he wants to acquire, and
generates three nonces NB1 , NB2 and NB3 such that NB3 = k x NB2
where k is a factor of NB1 .
3. Bob sends the messages
Mj = (
MA
g
xj (mod p)
)
NB1
NB2
NB3 (mod p)∀j ∈ [1, k] to Alice.
4. Bob also sends MB = g
NB1 (mod p).
5. Alice generates nonceNA2 and the set of keys {KA1, KA2, ..., KAn−1 , KAn}
as
KAj = ((MB)
NA1+Σ
n
i=1
xi−xj )NA2 (mod p)∀j ∈ [1, n].
6. Alice sends the messages [Mj ]
NA2 (mod p)∀j ∈ [1, k] to Bob.
7. Bob calculates KBj as [[Mj ]
NA2 ]
NB3
NB2 (mod p)∀j ∈ [1, k].
8. Alice sends all the secrets encrypted under the respective key (Si is en-
crypted under the key generatedKAi), i.e. {S1}KA1 , {S2}KA2 , {S3}KA3 ,...
{Sn}KAn .
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9. Bob can then decrypt the locked secrets that he wished to learn using
the keys KBj , ∀j ∈ [1, k] he has generated.
Let us understand the working of the above protocol with an example.
Example: Alice is in possession of say 5 secrets, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 (i.e. n=5).
They agree upon the safe prime p = 23, the generator g = 5 of the group Z23
and the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} such that 1 corresponds to S1, 2 corresponds to S2
and so on. They also decide the number of secrets to be transferred k = 2.
1. Alice generates nonce NA1 = 4 and sends
MA = 5
4+(1+2+3+4+5) (mod 23) ≡ 519 (mod 23)
≡ 7
2. Suppose Bob wants secrets S3 and S5. He therefore chooses x1 = 3 and
x2 = 5. He generates the nonces NB1 = 10, NB2 = 6 and NB3 = 12.
[Here, NB3 = k x NB2 where k = 2 which is a factor of NB1 ].
3. Bob calculates and sends the messages
M1 = (
7
10
)
5
(mod 23) ≡ (7× 10−1)5 (mod 23)
≡ 35 (mod 23)
≡ 13
M2 = (
7
20
)
5
(mod 23) ≡ (7× 20−1)5 (mod 23)
≡ 135 (mod 23)
≡ 4
4. Bob also sends MB = 5
10 (mod 23) ≡ 9.
5. Alice generates nonce NA2 = 8 and the calculates the following keys:
KA1 = (9
19−1)8 (mod 23) ≡ 9
KA2 = (9
19−2)8 (mod 23) ≡ 6
KA3 = (9
19−3)8 (mod 23) ≡ 4
KA4 = (9
19−4)8 (mod 23) ≡ 18
KA5 = (9
19−5)8 (mod 23) ≡ 12
Alice encrypts S1 with the key KA1 , S2 with the key KA2 and so on.
6. Alice calculates and sends M1
NA2 (mod p) = 138 (mod 23) ≡ 2 and
M2
NA2 (mod p) = 48 (mod 23) ≡ 9 to Bob.
9
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7. Bob calculates KB1 = 2
12
6 (mod 23) ≡ 4, and
KB2 = 9
12
6 (mod 23) ≡ 12.
8. Alice sends all the encrypted secrets to Bob i.e. {S1}KA1
, {S2}KA2
,
{S3}KA3
, {S4}KA4
and {S5}KA5
.
9. We can see that the keys generated for S3 and S5 by both Alice and
Bob are 4 and 12 respectively.
Thus, the generated keys by Alice and Bob (i.e. KAj and KBj ) for all the
chosen secrets ([1k]) are the same. The keys have thus been exchanged by
parties obliviously and can use a symmetric key cryptosystem for the transfer
of secrets.
6.3 Cost Analysis
The computational cost at Alice’s and Bob’s end can be seen to be n+k and
2k respectively [O(n + k) and O(2k)]. This is equal to the computational
cost at either end in the scheme proposed in [17]. The transfer cost would
be equal to n+2k+2 [O(n+ k)]. This again is equal in order to the scheme
proposed in the paper in [17].
7 Conclusion
The protocol in this paper equals the order of the 1-out-of-n protocol in
[5] both in computation and transfer. For k-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer,
it compromises on the adaptive nature of their protocol and requires that
both parties decide on the number k of secrets to be transferred before the
execution of the actual protocol. However, it improves the cost of their
k-out-of-n protocol and equals the order of the scheme proposed in [17].
The hash function used to avoid the same message attack takes negligible
computational cost due to the availability of very fast hashing algorithms.
The transfer of these also induces a minor overhead that does not affect the
order of the transfer cost.
The protocol uses Diffie-Hellman [6] based keys to encrypt and decrypt
the secrets. Our scheme basically allows both the parties to obliviously gen-
erate Diffie-Hellman keys. Such a primitive can be used in other applications
that use Diffie-Hellman based keys to ensure privacy.
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Although the order of the k-out-of-n protocol presented in this paper
and that proposed in [17] are the same, it is important to note that the
all the three rounds in the scheme proposed by Wu et.al. [17] involve the
transmission of the secret itself in an encrypted form. For smaller secrets,
both the protocols may exhibit similar performance. However, as the size of
the secrets increases, (in case of files) [17]’s protocol would have the rather
unnecessary overhead of transmitting the entire file in its encrypted form
(which of course cannot be significantly smaller than the file itself). Our
protocol on the other hand, transmits the encrypted secret only once and
thus will save significant bandwidth in a scenario involving large secrets. We
believe that such a scenario may occur frequently in applications such as
internet shopping for digital commodities, exchange of digital secrets, file
transfers, etc. Our protocol would be able to perform significantly better
under such circumstances.
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